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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11836

ROY LEE POE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of the appellant, Roy Lee Poe, for murder in the first degree
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953).
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE
LOWER COURT
The appellant on the 20th day of May, 1969, was
iound guilty by a jury of first degree murder in the
Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge, presiding. The jury
recommended leniency, and the appellant was
sentenced to life imprisonment on the 22nd day of
May, 1969.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the appellanr
conviction should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees generally with the lac':
as set out in appellant's summary of the evidenci
The respondent does, however, wish to take issu;
with some specific statements and add some fac';
which are important.
On page 6 of the appellant's brief, the appe
lant in the second full paragraph, is not making·
statement of the facts, but is arguing his case. Tt.:
statements are conclusory and reflect only the a:
pellant's opinion as to what the district attorney di:
Mr. Vern Phillips also testified that the appella:
told him that he, Poe, had just killed somebody[
832). This took place on the 6th day of Novembe:
1965, the same day that the victim was shot (T.
In the prosecution's rebuttal, Mr. Delton Ra
Nance testified that while in the Washington Coun:.
Jait with the appellant, Mr. Poe told him that n
went to Las Vegas in a station wagon (T. 1037). Nisl
Mr. Cal Whitney testified that he did not go wit
the appellant to Pete's Wagon Wheel or to Me:
quite, Nevada (T. 1049) as a Mr. Dean Anderson he
testified earlier (T. 904, 906).
It is a critical fact that the appellant was n:
given the death penalty, but rather was given lr
imprisonment (Judgment on Verdict).
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Other facts which are relevant are set out in detail in the points of argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY REFUSING TO VOIRE DIRE THE JURY REGARDING THEIR SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS.

During the selection of the jury members,
counsel for the appellant requested that the Court
voire dire each prospective juror to determine his
specific religious denomination. This motion was
made for the purpose of determining whether any
of the prospective jurors had established a moral or
religious attitude regarding capital punishment (T.
64). The trial judge decided that it was not necessary to ask each prospective juror what church they
belonged to (T. 69). He did ask, however, whether
any of the jurors had any "religious" or "moral"
scruples with regard to the death penalty (T. 84).
The court excused two jurors because they answered yes to the question of whether these scruples
would cause them to be prejudiced one way or another (T. 84-85).
It should be noted at the outset of this argument
that the appellant was not given the death penalty.
The iury recommended leniency, and the trial
court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment.
Uury Verdict; Judgment on Verdict.) This fact renders Point I of Appellant's Brief moot. Even assuming that the court erred by its refusal to ask each
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juror what his religion was, the appellant has nr
been prejudiced in any way. He cannot now cla!::
that the court committed "prejudicial" error.
"After hearing an appeal the court must
give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties. If error has been committed, it
shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has
that effect before it is warranted in reversing
the judgment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953). See also State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d
153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966).

The appellant has failed to show any prejudice
he has not shown any defect or error whkh affecte:
his substantial rights since the death penalty Wai
never imposed upon him.
The trial court did not commit error by refi;:
ing to voire dire the jury regarding their sped·
::-eligious denominations. In Witherspoon v. United Staff'
391 U.S. 510 (1968), the defendant had been convic
ed of murder in Illinois. An Illinois statute provided
"In trials for murder it shall be a cause for
challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples
against capital punishment, or that he is opposed
to the same." 391 U.S. at 512 (Emphasis
added.)

The Supreme Court ruled that the effect of
statute was to stack the jury with those who wers
not opposed to the death penalty. The imposition °·
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the death penalty was reversed in Witherspoon. The
Court said:
" .. in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully
short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 516.

Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias
may be taken:
"If the offense charged is punishable with
death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as preclude [the Juror's] finding the
defendant guilty, in which case he must neither
be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19 (9) (1953). (Emphasis added.)

The Utah statute is easily distinguishable from
the Illinois statute. Under the Utah law, mere conscientious scruples are not enough to challenge a
prospective juror. The bias must be sufficiently
strong so as to preclude the juror's finding the defendant guilty. This standard is in harmony with
the \'vitherspoon decision. In Witherspoon the court never
did address itself to the issue of whether or not
death-qualified jurors could be excused if their
scruples would prohibit an impartial finding on the
guilt-innocence issue. Witherspoon was limited only
to the issue punishment. This is emphasized further
by the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and reversed only the death penalty. This
Point alone is sufficient to distinguish Witherspoon. In
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this case the appellant was not given the death penalty, although he was convicted of first degree
murder. This Court can affirm appellant's conviction
without having to decide on the basis of Witherspoon
The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has
ruled on a statute identical to Utah Code Ann.§ 7730-19(9) (1953). In upholding the conviction the
court made the following distinction:
" . . . the rationale of Witherspoon is mapposite to the Nevada statute since the statutory purpose is to disqualify jurors whose
opinions against the death penalty would preclude their finding the defendant guilty. The
Illinois statute considered in Witherspoon did
not involve the right to challenge for cause
those prospective jurors who stated that their
reservations about capital punishment would
prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." Howard v.
State, 446 P.2d 163, 165 (Nev. 1968).

This position was confirmed in Barnes v. State, 450 P.2d
150 (Nev. 1969).
More recently, this Court has had the opportun·
ity to compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(9) (1953)
with Witherspoon. In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231,
461 P.2d 297 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the exclusion of footnote 21 of the Witherspoon case.
The Court quoted:
" ... we repeat, however, that nothing we
say today bears upon the power of a State to
execute a defendant sentenced to death by a
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jury from which the only veniremen who were
in fact excluded for cause were those who made
it unmistakably clear ( 1) that they would
Automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of
the case before them or (2) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt." Id. at ________ , 461 P.2d at 303.

The trial court committed no errors by refusing
to voire dire the jury regarding their specific religious denominations, especially since the death
penalty was not imposed. The specific denomination is not material.
POINT IA
THE TRIAL COURT ACCOMPLISHED THE OBJECTIVE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN VOIRE DIRE BY
QUESTIONING THE JURY REGARDING THEIR RELIGIOUS AND MORAL ATTITUDES AB 0 UT THE
DEATH PENALTY.

Although the trial judge did not ask each prospective juror what his religion was, he did inquire
whether any juror had "religious" or "moral"
scruples about the death penalty (T. 84). The respondent submits that this latter inquiry accomplished the defense counsel's objective to determine
each juror's feelings on the death penalty. The fact
that a prospective juror is Mormon, Catholic or Jew
is not material. Whether one has religious or moral
scruples about the death penalty is material. The
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judge asked the only question that could have ac
complished defense counsel's purpose. By know!nc
that a prospective juror is Mormon does not mea!
ipso facto that he is opposed to the death penalty
On the other hand, by asking each juror specifica].
ly whether he has scruples, the court anc
attorneys can then make a determination as 'c
whether these scruples will prejudice the prospec
tive juror. Unless a veniremen states unambiguous·
ly that he would automatically vote for or
the imposition of capital punishment no matter wha
the trial might reveal, it cannot be assumed tha1•
this is his position. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. srn
(1968). Because a person is Mormon, it cannot be
assumed that he would vote for the death penalty.
It is not necessary that veniremen be asked their
specific religion; in fact, the question accomplishes
nothing. The judge committed no errors, but rather
avoided error by refusing to voire dire about spe
cific religions. The defense counsel's objective WaB
accomplished, and he cannot now claim error. II
is also significant here that no death penalty was
imposed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU·
DICIAL ERROR IN THE MANNER OF SELECTING
THE ADDITIONAL JURORS.

Before answering this argument, it should be
pointed out by the respondent that none of the six
additional prospective jurors summoned by Judge
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Day were on the jury which rendered the guilty
verdict. Only one was called as an alternate (T. 128)
but he was not needed and was excused before the
jury deliberated (T. 1063). Even assuming that the
judge committed error in the manner of selecting
the additional prospective jurors, no prejudice resulted to the appellant. The appellant has not challenged the manner of selecting the jury which actually found him guilty. It must be presumed that
this selection was correct and in accordance with
the Utah Statute governing selection. Utah Code
Ann.§ 78-46-23 (1953); State v. Moore, 111Utah458, 183
P.2d 973 (1947).
should be p o int e d out, furthermore,
that these additional jurors were summoned only
for the purpose of selecting one additional juror for
purposes of allowing ten preemptory challenges
for each side (T. 91). There were only 31 jurors in
the box and one more was needed to allow the preemptory challenges (T. 91 ). The six were also selected for the purpose of selecting one alternate juror
(T. 91). After the jury had been selected, not one
of the additional six were on the panel (T. 110). Only
one was selected as an alternate (T. 128). There is
nothing in this result which could have prejudiced
the appellant. The jury which determined the appellant's guilt was a "body truly representative of
the community." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
86 0941). Even assuming that the court was in error
to select persons from the small community of Parowan, the result was still that the jury finally selected
It
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was "drawn from the cross-section of the commu:
ity." State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 09oi
In criminal cases, where the venire of the )urcr:
summoned for term has been exhausted, and ili:
court directs additional names to be drawn from fu,
box, names of jurors not readily accessible becaui:
residing at a distance may be properly laid asiaf
and other names drawn. State v. ClujI' 48 Utah m
158 Pac. 701 (1916).
The implication of his holding is that jurors maj
be selected from the immediate surrounding are:
of the court. Other names may be drawn until
not "at a distance" are found. This is in accord wifr
the Utah Statute.
"If during any term of a district court any
additional ... trial jurors shall be drawn from
the said box by the sheriff or his deputy in
open court; but if in the judgment of the court
the attendance of any drawn cannot be obtained
within a reasonable time, they may be laid aside
and other names may be drawn in their place
and in the same manner. If all names become
exhausted at any term, the judge may order
an open venire for such number of jurors as
he deems necessary, who shall be summoned
to serve." Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-23 (1953).
(Emphasis added.)

In this case Judge Day determined that because
of the time involved, it was more expedient to summon the additional jurors rather than take the time
to draw out names when the result would be the
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same, i.e., the additional prospective jurors would
be from the surrounding area regardless of the manner in which they were selected. Those names
drawn which could not be summoned within a
reasonable time, would have been drawn until those
not at a distance could be summoned. It is more expedient in the interest of time and because of the
circumstances, i.e., only one additional juror was
needed, for the judge to summon the jurors directly. The trial court committed no error, and the appellant was not prejudiced in any way.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR

BY ADMITTING CERTAIN TEST IM 0 NY OF THE

PRIOR TRIAL TO BE READ TO THE JURY.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-3 (1953) provides:
"Whenever in any court of record the testimony of any witness in any criminal case shall
be stenographically reported by an official
court reporter, and thereafter such witness
shall die or be beyond the jurisdiction of the
court in which the cause is pending, either
party to the action may read in evidence the
testimony of such witness, when duly certified
by the reporter to be correct, in any subsequent
trial of, or proceeding had in the same cause,
subject only to the same objections that might
be made, if such witnesses were upon the stand
and testifying in open court."

This statute is clear that, in Utah, testimony of prior
trials may be read at a subsequent hearing where
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it is determined that the witness is outside the jurisdiction of the court.

The appellant cites State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313.
392 P.2d 486 (1964), for the proposition that there
must be a showing that the witness "is in fact beyond the jurisdiction of the court." (Appellant's
Brief p. 15). Kazda does not contain such a proviso.
Nothing in Kazda goes to the effort or degree of prool
that one must show before the court will allow test!·
mony from a prior trial to be read in a subsequenl
hearing on the same cause. Respondent submits
that this assertion is false and not based on the Kazda
case. The Court held only that "A witness outside
of the state is 'beyond the jurisdiction of the court.'"
15 Utah 2d at 316, 392 P.2d at 488.
The general common law rule is, that, if due
diligence to locate a witness has been exerted, and
the witness cannot be located, then testimony from
a prior trial can be read at a subsequent hearing.

Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control B o a r d v. Lobo,

391 P.2d 819 (Okl. 1964); Bird v. State, 362 P.2d 117
(Okl. Cr. 1961).
"Where the accused at a former trial or at
a preliminary hearing once enjoyed his right to
be confronted by a witness against him and had
the privilege of cross-examinating the witness,
if at a subsequent trial, involving the same issue, it satisfactorily appears that . . . his
[witness'] presence with due diligence cannot
be had, ... or where his whereabouts cannot
with due diligence be ascertained, a transcript
of the testimony of such witness may be intro-
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duced as the evidence of such absent witness."
391 P.2d at 821.

The respondent asks this court to adopt this standard
of due diligence and hold that the prosecution did
with due diligence attempt to locate both Louis P.
Lagana and Mary Miner; and that the trial court did
not err in allowing their written testimony to be read
at the second trial (T. 804, 821).
Both Louis Lagana and Mary Miner testified at
the first trial and both were cross examined, or at
least defense counsel had an opportunity to
cross exam (T. 173). The court reporter also testified
that the prior testimony of Mr. Lagana and Mrs.
Miner was accurately reported (T. 803), State v. Leggroan, 15 Utah 2d 153, 389 P.2d 142 (1964). The defense
counsel, furthermore, stipulated to the above (T. 802803).
Harry E. McCoy testified that he had subpoenas
for both Lagana and Miner (T. 163; 167). Mr. Lagana
could not be located in Utah or Nevada (T. 167). Mr.
McCoy testified that Mrs. Miner could not be located in Utah or Nevada. Mr. McCoy went to Nevada
for the purpose of locating the witnesses and serving them with subpoenas (T. 167; 170). Since a person outside the state is not in the jurisdiction of the
court, State i'. Kazda, supra, the efforts of Mr. McCoy
were more than "due diligence" within the meani11g of the common law rule.
Phillip Lang Fore m aster , the Washington
County Attorney, testified that he prepared the sub-
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poenas for Mr. Lagana and Mary Miner (T. 729). He
testified that to the best of his knowledge Mary
Miner was in New York (T. 730).
Clark Robison, a deputy sheriff of Clark County,
Nevada, testified that Mary Miner had lived in
Mesquite, Nevada, but was not living there at the
time he attempted to contact her (T. 744). To the bes\
of his knowledge, Mary Miner lived in Eastern
United States (T. 745). He concluded that she was
not available for service of process (T. 745). He also
testiied that he could not locate Mr. Lagana for service of the subpoena (T. 748).
Mr. McCoy was again called to testify (T. 750).
He testified that Mr. Lagana had taken employmen!
in the Midwest somewhere with the Atchison and
Santa Fe Railroad (T. 754). He received this infor·
mation from Mr. Lagana' s previous employer (T.
753).
Sheriff Evan Whitehead, Sheriff of Washington
County, Utah, checked the Utah directories for Mr.
Lagana and Mrs. Miner (T. 761, 764). He also checked
with every sheriff in every Utah county. Each department checked their directories and were un·
able to locate Lagana or Miner (T. 792-795). There
were no vehicles registered to either Mr. Lagana
or Mrs. Miner or to the husband of Mary Miner (T.
795-797).
It was only after this showing of due diligence
that the trial judge admitted the previous testimony
(T. 799; 821). The court did not commit error by its
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determination that a diligent effort was made to locate Louis P. Lagana and Mary Miner. As far as the
judge was concerned the witnesses were out of the
jurisdiction of the court and could not be served.
The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-3 (1953)
were met, and the previous testimony was properly
admitted at the second trial.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR

BY ALLOWING CERTAIN PICTURES TO BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.

The appellant is challenging the admissibility
of exhibits 8 and 9. Said exhibits were black and
white pictures of the deceased taken before the victim was removed from the scene of the murder (T.
199).
It is a matter of discretion with the trial judge to
determine whether the probative value of a picture
outweighs the possible adverse effects which the
pictures may have upon the jury. State v. Renzo, 21
Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968). "This discretion on
the part of a trial judge ... should not be interfered
with by an appellate court unless manifest error is
shown." Id. at 215, 443 P.2d at 299. State v. Poe, 15 Utah
2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968). The trial court judge did
not abuse its discretion by admitting exhibits 8 and
9.
The state had the burden of showing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of
first degree murder. The elements of first degree
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murder include a showing of "wilful, delibera16
malicious and premeditated killing; ... " Utah Codt
Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953). The pictures, admitted in evi
dence, were offered to show malice and premedila·
tion, etc. By showing that the victim was
when he was shot, it eliminates any doubt but tho:
there was a wilful and deliberate killing. Such pro
bative value clearly outweighs the fact that the pie
tures may have been offensive to some.
In State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d lQQj
0944), the Utah Supreme Court said:
". . . The pictures of the deceased taken
after her death and showing her wounds, were
clearly admissible. Even though the defendant
did admit the killing, he did not admit the intent to kill and the nature of the wounds may
be material on that point. The pictures showed
the nature of the wounds more clearly than the
testimony of witnesses could." Id. at 133, 145
P.2d at 1010.

Also in State v. Renzo, supra, pictures of the victim, for
whose death the defendant was charged with first
degree murder, disclosing in color the bruised con·
dition of the victim's body and perforations ol
walls of the victim's vagina, offered to show a de·
praved mind on the part of the defendant, were
properly admitted into evidence.
These cases support the trial judge's determina·
tion that exhibits 8 and 9 had probative value to
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show intent. The court did not err by admitting them
into evidence. No manifest error has been shown
and this court should not interfer with Judge Day's
discretion.
The appellant's reliance on State v. Poe, supra, is
without proper foundation. In Poe these same two
pictures were offered and admitted into evidence.
21 Utah 2d at 117, 441 P.2d at 514. The Court did not
hold that the admission of these black and white
photographs was error. Rather, the court said that
the trial judge abused its discretion by admitting
colored slides into evidence and permitting them
to be shown to the jury. Id. Also the court made its
decision on the fact that the death penalty was im·
posed. Id. Since no death penalty was imposed at
the second trial, the appellant cannot say that the
pictures influenced the jury to impose the death penalty.
The probative value of the pictures, i.e., to show
a wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing, outweighed any possible adverse effects which
the pictures may have had upon the jury. There was
no error and appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY REQUIRING THE JURY TO RETIRE AND DELIBERATE AT A LATE HOUR.

18

The Utah Supreme Court has said that trh
judge has the final responsibility for conducting thf
trial, and he should be allowed "considerable lat;
tude of discretion with respect to the mechanics c:
procedure; and his rulings must be sustained unles1
he has acted in some manner which is clearly arb1
trary and unreasonable and to the prejudice of the
objecting party." Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d
11, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (1960). The decision of the tr!a:
judge was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and the
appellant has failed to show how he was prejudiced
In Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines, 1 Utah 2d 299.
265 P.2d 1007 (1954), the Court said that it is within
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine
at what time the jury should deliberate. The cour!
cautions against unreasonable exercise of that dis
cretion and says that the rights of both parties
should be safeguarded. The trial judge in Xena!V
did not abuse his discretion by causing the jury to
deliberate at a late hour.

1

"Should it be assumed that he did so, it
does not necessarily follow that such procedure
adversely affected the plaintiffs." Id. at 307,
265 P.2d at 1012.

Judge Day did not abuse his discretion by al·
lowing the jury to deliberate at a late hour. The appellant has assumed that only he was prejudiced
Both parties were effected equally by the judge's
decision. The appellant cannot assume that the jury
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would find him guilty just because they deliberated
at a late hour.
Furthermore, Judge Day based his decision on
the fact that the jury had only heard one hour and
twenty minutes of testimony in the morning and
only two hours in the afternoon (T. 1059-1060). The
jury had had a weekend to recover and rest (T. 1060).
They retired to consider the verdict at 7:38 p.m. (T.
1063). They reached their verdict at 3: 10 a.m. (T.
1070). There was no abuse of discretion, and the trial
judge did not act arbitrarily and unreasonably as
evidenced by the above facts. More prejudicial effects could have resulted if the trial judge had interupted the jury's deliberation. The court did not
commit error; rather, it avoided error.
POINT VI
THE APPELLANT WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.

None of the errors claimed by the appellant
were committed. The trial judge took precautions to
insure a fair and impartial trial. The appellant, moreover, has not been able to show that he was prejudiced in any way. This Court must presume that a
fair trial was held, and it cannot reverse for mere
technicalities. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953).
CONCLUSION
The respondent asks this court to affirm Mr.
Poe's conviction of murder in the first degree and
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hold that the trial court did not commit any prejud.
cial errors.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief AsE'istant Attorney
General
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